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Abstract. One of the tasks of software agents on the Internet will be to close contracts
on behalf of their owner.  The closing of a contract is subject to liabilities. In this,
there is no distinction between the real world and the virtual world. Like in the real
world, within the virtual world a distinction has to be made between the precontractual
phase and the contractual phase. The liabilities in these phases are different. Therefore
negotiation protocols for agents need to distinguish between these phases and different
responsibilities may exist in the different phases. This paper presents some of the
issues involved, viewed from a technical and legal perspective.
1. Introduction
The Internet and its advent of E-commerce applications involving software agents (He
and Leung, 2002) gives rise to the issue whether software agents can legally close
contracts. Technically, software agents are autonomous and pro-active, can
autonomously (Castelfranchi, 2001) roam the Internet, perform transactions, and gather
information. It can be questioned though whether agents are allowed to act
autonomously from a legal point of view, especially when performing legal acts, like
closing a contract. This paper presents a view on contract negotiations between agents
combining the research areas Law and Computer Science, addressing Dutch law and
relevant EU legislation.
Negotiations between parties are a means to agree upon issues that may result in the
closure of a contract. However, not all negotiations lead to a contract; sometimes
negotiations fail. In such a case, parties go their separate ways without further
obligations. Sometimes, however, the negotiations are not fully noncommittal. Costs
have been incurred or expectations have been raised that may have led to, for instance,
breaking off negotiations with other parties. In legal terms, this is the domain of
precontractual liability; explicitly present in civil-law, but not in common law. When
negotiating with other software agents, software agents may also encounter the problems
referring to the distinction between the various phases and obligations and liabilities
connected to these phases. This problem is dealt with in the first part of this paper.
The actual contracting by software agents raises other concerns: what is actually
needed to agree on a contract? How can software agents technically comply with these
requirements? Are there good practices to which a software agent can adhere to make
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the process of contracting run smoothly? These questions are the subject of the second
part of this paper. The paper concludes with a discussion.
2. Pre-contractual liability
2.1 Legal analysis
Based on Dutch case law, it is possible to distinguish between three stages within the
process of negotiations (Hartkampand Asser, 2001). The distinction between the stages
is made on the basis of good faith.
Stage 1: Parties are free to break off negotiations without any obligation to compensate
the other party;
Stage 2: According to the criterion of good faith a party is still free to break off the
negotiations. However, there is the condition that he compensates the other party
for (all or some of) the expenses made;
Stage 3: According to the criterion of good faith a party is no longer free to break off the
negotiations. If that party nevertheless breaks off the negotiations, he is obliged
to compensate the other party for expenses and  - in some cases - for the profits
the other party would have made, if the contract had been closed.
In the process of negotiation, these stages are not formally demarcated; the stages are
made explicit and discussed after a dispute has arisen in the pre-contractual sphere. To
give the users of software agents some support with respect to issues of precontractual
liability, we propose to accommodate the different stages in a rudimentary form in the
protocols used for agent-negotiation. A ‘rudimentary’ form is chosen because the open
texturedness of the concept of ‘good faith’ is difficult to catch in a computer-
understandable conceptualisation and perhaps impossible.
When distinguishing between the various phases the concept of ‘good faith’ is not
taken as a starting point, but a number of events that are indicative for the different
stages: a pragmatic approach. Software agents may recognise a number of events that
are indicative for later problems and may support their respective users in taking
appropriate actions. Examples of relevant events are:
1. event: a party is about to incur costs for the preparation of the contract;
relevance: who bears the costs in case the contract does not materialise?
2. event: a party breaks off parallel negotiations;
relevance: the party becomes more dependent upon successful conclusion of
the negotiations.
Negotiation protocols should be based on these events. If costs are about to be incurred,
the parties’ software agents must agree about who bears the costs. If an agent is about to
break off parallel negotiations  the agent must try and agree with the agent with which he
is to proceed that henceforward the breaking off of negotiations means that the other
party must be compensated for possible losses. The incomplete character of the
recognition of the stages, means that the user of the software agent must be adequately
warned: the software agent can recognise some pitfalls of pre-contractual liability, but
not all. The mere recognition of the existence of these events and the phases may be
important for the assignment of liability. The details of this recognition under the various
legal systems is still a topic of further research.
2.2 Technical issues for pre-contractual phase
The importance of well-defined protocols of negotiation is evident. At least, which legal
system holds, which general conditions apply and which obligations hold at which
moment / during which phase, needs to be communicated/advertised in non-ambiguous
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terms. In addition, protocols may define specifics about message delivery (message is
sent versus message is received semantics). It is unclear if this is possible, since it would
mean interpreting certain concepts and trying to put them in non-disputable formats,
covering various legal systems. It is a topic of further research to discover whether this is
possible: if not, to what extent this would require general directives concerning the use
of software agents, including adaptation of the various legal systems.
It is not common for E-commerce protocols to distinguish between a pre-contractual
phase and a contract closure phase; they usually focus on the latter phase (e.g., Sherif,
2000) in which non-repudiation and authenticity play an important role. Note that this
may be due to the legal system assumed. Below, a number of protocols is briefly
described:
• The Secure Electronic Transaction Protocol, (Lu and Smolka, 1999), focuses on
secure payment card transactions (e.g., by Visa and MasterCard).
• The Internet Key Protocol (Bellare, Garay, Hauser, Herzberg, Krawczyk, Steiner,
Tsudik, and Waidner, 1995) consists of a number of secure electronic payment
protocols, with varying degrees of non-repudiation and authentication.
• The fair non-repudiation protocol (Zhou and Gollmann, 1996) is more general and
involves a trusted-third party to ensure fairness about message reception and
integrity.
• The open trading protocol (Bichler, Segev and Zhao, 1998) is a broader protocol for
interoperability of electronic purchases, including payment, invoices and delivery.
• The Needham-Schroeder public key protocol is also more general and establishes
mutual authentication between initiators and responders.
A view on the general and specific protocols described above is that their basic line may be used
for assuring ’statements’ between parties, and form a basis for protocols distinguishing the two
phases. More research is clearly required on this topic, e.g. in the context of contract management
systems, in which a pre-contractual phase is conceptually distinguished, but not operationally
included (Boulmakoul and Sallé, 2002).
Protocols employ languages and ontologies such as the WSDL, OWL (successor of
DAML-S and OIL; Patel-Schneider, Horrocks and van Harmelen, 2002), or RDF
(W3c.org). Most agent communication languages (ACLs) (e.g., Fipa ACL, 2002) upon
which most communication between agents is based, currently do not include primitives
for these phases, nor do they include properties describing the phases of negotiation/
contract assessment, although they do provide negotiation primitives. This is an area that
needs further attention within the web and agent community.
There are logics in which, e.g., beliefs, intentions, commitments, good faith are
expressed (e.g., Rao and Georgeff, 1993). Verification of an agent’ s status on the basis
of such logics in which an agent’ s reasoning is expressed may be possible in a number of
cases. The question is, however, whether courts of law are willing to accept proofs
expressing an agent’ s intent/beliefs as legal evidence. The implementation of such
systems is, in most cases, not fully tractable nor verifiable, possibly making evidence
unreliable.
Another point of consideration is whether strategies can and/or should be conveyed.
To the extent that strategies are known (see literature on game theory), this may be
possible, but most likely not desirable. Time constraints in negotiation may, in some
cases, be a point of concern. Technical guarantees for all real-time constraints are not
currently feasible. If mechanisms for fault-tolerant agent systems such as those being
developed by (Marin, Sens, Briot and Guessoum, 2001) are included in new agent
platforms, a certain level of certainty may be provided for specific classes of constraints.
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Agents and agent platforms (which support agents) may be obliged to trace their
actions. Traceability involves logging information about agent actions, a process which
leads to large amount of tracing data, possibly distributed among multiple agent
platforms in different legal domains. Determining the granularity of the actions logged,
the reliability of tracing data, and storing and processing such tracing data may not be
easily accomplished and requires more research.
3. Contract formation
3.1 Legal analysis
What implications do contract law and legal practice have for the use of software agents
for contract formation? With respect to the actual contracting the requirements that a
software agent must meet can be divided into three categories:
1. basic requirements for the contract to be formed  in a legally valid way,
2. compulsory rules that must be adhered to (e.g. to protect weaker parties) and
3. good practices (e.g. the collection of evidence).
1. Basic requirements
Contracts come about by statements. The user uses the software agent as a means to
make a statement (Weitzenböck, 2001; Esch. 1999). In order for the software agent to
function correctly as a means for making statements the following requirements must be
met:
• The user of the software agent must have control over the (goals of the) software
agent; e.g. he must be able to switch the software agent on or off, he can instruct the
software agent, etc.
• The software agent must be transparent to the user: the user must be able to foresee
what the software agent is going to do/declare. Without transparency, control by the
user is illusory.
• The actions of the software agent must not be corrupted; the software agent must be
reliable and it must have sufficient security built into it.
• The sending and receiving software agents must be ‘attuned to each other’  in order
to prevent miscommunication.
A  different  basic requirement concerns the legal capacity of the user of a software agent
to close a contract. A minor lacks, e.g., the capacity to close a contract. This issue is not
dealt with here, but it is an issue that is a major discussion topic between lawyers dealing
with software agents. The final conclusion has, as yet, not been reached.
2. Compulsory rules
The compulsory rules as found in the Directive 2001/31/EC and the Directive 97/7/EC
address information duties (Lodder and Voulon, 2002). From a technical perspective it is
not so much the content of those information requirements that is relevant; these are for
lawyers to fill in once technical format has been found. It is rather the form and the time
at which the information is to be supplied to the other contracting party that determine
the technical decisions to be taken.
For example, consider the form requirement: in certain circumstances, art. 5 Directive
97/7/EC requires a supplier to send to a consumer a ‘written confirmation or
confirmation in another durable medium available and accessible to him’ . If the consumer
uses a mobile software agent for communication with the supplier, there may be a
problem: can storage in a software agent considered to be durable? Are there any
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requirements that may make it durable if met. Is the information stored in an agent
available to the consumer if the agent resides at a remote location? The answer to these
questions is not clear, but an answer in the negative is not unlikely. The problem is not
made easier by the fact that the Directive burdens the supplier with the duty to provide
the information in the required form, but the consumer cannot be ordered not to use a
mobile agent. Technically a solution may be found in that an ACL provides for a way to
indicate that information sent to the mobile agent of the recipient must immediately be
forwarded to the user of the software agent and stored on a durable medium, such as the
hard disk of the user. The supplier can then configure his information in such a way that
the receiving software agent understands what is expected (forward to user and store on
his hard disk).
3. Good practices
Evidence must be collected during contract formation in order to prove the existence and
contents of the contract at a later date. More specifically, it is desirable to have evidence
about the following facts:
• The identity of each party to the contract (see below).
• The authentication by each party. Authentication means that a party has adopted the
contents of the contract as his own. Typically, a signature (or an electronic signature)
is used for authentication purposes. With respect to the proof of the authentication,
several subproofs can be discerned. In the first place, the fact of the adoption itself
must be provable. In the second place, it must be clear who adopted the contents of
the contract. In the third place, the adoption by a party must provably concern the
contents of the contract. The latter may be a problem if several versions of a contract
exist or, in case of man-machine interaction, if the contract displayed on the screen
differs from the contract that is electronically signed.
• The ‘authority’  of the software agent to make a statement. Can it be proven that the
agent did or did not act under the influence of a bug or a fraud? Can it be proven that
the instructions the user gave to the software agent, are the instructions on which the
software agent has acted?
• The integrity of the contract must be preserved, between the moment of its coming
into existence and the moment of evidence delivery.
Apart from evidence delivery, other aspects are in practice closely related to contracting.
• Confidentiality of communications. A party can have (one of) several reasons for
keeping the contents of data confidential, such as competitive considerations, or
prevention of fraud (e.g. in case of a credit card number)
3.2 Technical issues for contract closure phase
This section describes the agent specific technical measures that can be taken to close
contracts. For most of the measures accepted techniques in, e.g. software engineering,
human computer interaction and security, can be identified. This section only addresses
agent specific measures.
Technical measures for the producer of the software agent:
• The software agent of the supplier supports structured negotiation that discerns the
consecutive phases of negotiation and can recognise and speak different protocols.
Technical measures for the producer of the software agent and the supplier of goods:
• Software agents need to be able to structure negotiation and contract finalisation
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using a standard/agreed ontology of which the syntax and semantics is known.
• Agents need an Agent Communication Language (ACL)1 to interact and provide
agents with the means to exchange information and knowledge. Various ACL’s exist
(e.g., FIPA, 2002). For the development and use of agents it is important to know
the characteristics of these languages. Standard ontologies are needed with which
contract negotiation and finalisation can be structured.
The producer of the software agent:
• The software agent of the supplier supports structured negotiation that discerns the
consecutive phases of negotiation.
• There are three types of information exchange within the context of the closure of a
contract: the exchange of information with the other party, the exchange of
information with marketplace, the exchange of information with parties that need to
know information in order to fulfil their part in the collective that constitutes the
contracting party.
The consumer:
• It is advisable that the consumer makes public (or at least communicates to partners
in negotiation) for what contracts the software agent is authorised, and to what
extent.
The producer of the agent:
• It must be clear to the user of the software agent what the authorisations and the
instructions of the software agent are.
• The software agent (of the consumer) must have means to communicate to another
(the supplier) its authorisations and instructions.
The agent platform:
• Support for authorisation should be provided by agent platforms. Different
techniques may be used. Certificates is one option, encrypted messages using a PKI
another.
• Safeguarding of agents and their associated (contractual) data.
4. Concluding remarks
Contracting plays a role in many possible applications of software agents. E-commerce is
an obvious example, but by far not the only one. This paper focuses mainly on
applications within e-commerce, but many of the observations also hold for other
contract forms.
What has become obvious is that closing a contract with the help, or even by means of
a software agent is not easy from a legal point of view. The legal rules are all directed
towards human beings or corporations. Using software agents means introducing a new
and different legal situation. Not all legal rules can be applied to that situation. But also
software agents have to be constructed in such a way that they meet the legal
requirements for closing of contracts.
                                                  
1
 The origin of ACL’s can be traced back to the Knowledge Sharing Effort (KSE) that was initiated by
DARPA in 1990 [Labrou, Y., Finin, T., Peng, Y, (1999)]. In KSE researchers from both academia and
industry co-operated. The goal of the KSE was to develop techniques, methodologies and software
tools for knowledge sharing, reuse for design, implementation or execution.
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This paper has named some of the questions about the legal requirements for legally
valid closure of contracts by software agents. It has also addressed some of the technical
possibilities to meet with these requirements. It is important to note that this paper only
addresses and poses the questions and does not yet give full solutions to the problems
indicated. For this a lot more research is necessary as often stated in this paper. It is,
however, clear is that software agents also need to distinguish between the
precontractual and contractual phase, since the obligations, liabilities and according
requirements, both technical and organisational, differ in these phases. It is unclear
whether a software agents will ever be able to distinguish between these phases on its
own. The border between these phases is rather diffuse and dependent on the
interpretation of concepts like good faith. The problem may be partly solved by
agreements and standards incorporated in generally agreed upon protocols for agents. It
remains to be seen whether such solutions can also be used to handle the difference
between legal systems. We would strongly recommend to research the possibilities to
reach agreements on these topics and incorporate those results in negotiation protocols.
Other topics that need to be researched more closely are the necessity for traceability
of an agent’ s actions referring to evidence in negotiations. How secure and durable
should this information be? To keep all information may lead to an information overload.
What is legally necessary, minimum and maximum? Can standards for this be defined?
Can this information be secured, so it cannot be interfered with in a later phase, thus
validating its authenticity to make it valid legal proof?
These and many more questions will actually rise when agents roam the Internet and
are able to close contracts. Now it is the time to research and explore these topics to
formulate the measures needed in the future.
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